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Abstract
Two sources of workerspro-social motivation have been considered in the literature: action-
oriented altruism and output-oriented altruism. This paper presents evidence from a eld ex-
periment, which aims to identify and quantify them. The idea behind our experimental design
is to measure in a precise way the level of e¤ort exerted in an environment that elicits purely
selsh behavior and compare it to e¤ort in an environment that also induces action-oriented
altruism. We then compare the latter to e¤ort exerted in an environment where both types of
altruistic preferences are elicited. We nd that action-oriented altruism accounts for a signicant
increase in e¤ort, while there is no additional impact due to output-oriented altruism. We also
nd signicant gender-related di¤erences in the treatment e¤ect: women are very responsive to
the treatment condition eliciting action-oriented altruism, while mens behavior is not a¤ected
by any of the treatments.
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1 Introduction
What motivates workers on their job? For certain type of workers, besides extrinsic rewards, an
important drive is a concern towards the social cause pursued by the organization they work for,
or a sense of altruism towards the welfare of a third party that is the recipient of the good or
service being produced in their workplace. Such workers are willing to make labor donations, by
providing on-the-job e¤ort beyond what is contractually required of them. There is mounting
empirical evidence that this type of labor donations are important in organizations engaging in the
provision of education, health care, child-care, and social services as well as in charities and NGOs
that advance all sorts of social missions.1
A recent burgeoning theoretical literature in economics recognizes the important role of workers
pro-social motivations and examines their implications for the design of incentive contracts, the
selection of workers, the provision of e¤ort and organizational design, see for instance, Besley and
Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Dixit (2002), Francois (2000, 2007), Glazer (2004),
Murdock (2002). Typically, two alternative views of altruism have been considered (a) Action-
oriented altruism: the worker derives direct nonpecuniary benets from the act of contributing
to a cause she cares about2 and (b) Output-oriented altruism: the worker is concerned about
the actual impact of her actions or the well-being of others.3 The two key implications of these
approaches are that (1) An altruistic worker will provide more e¤ort, and, (2) An altruistic worker
requires less monetary compensation, see for instance Besley and Ghatak (2005). In addition,
papers that have taken the output-oriented approach, see for instance Francois (2000, 2007), have
shown that this way of modelling pro-social preferences has implications for organizational design, as
organizations without residual claimants may have an advantage in eliciting workersaltruistically
motivated contributions to the organizations output. More broadly, the two approaches have also
implications for the motivation of workers in corporations that pursue social ends via corporate
social responsibility (CSR) policies. In particular, the exact nature of workerspro-social motivation
matters for the design of the CSR policy (e.g. should the fraction of the rms prots that is donated
to the social cause be linked to workersproductivity or not).
1Most notable is the recent evidence in the paper by Gregg et al. (2008) who study the incidence of donated labor
in the U.K., measured by unpaid overtime, and nd that it is more likely to occur in the not-for-prot sector than in
the for-prot sector.
2There may be various psychological underpinnings for this, including the receipt of social recognition that improves
self-respect or pride (Benabou and Tirole 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008), which has been the focus of some
recent experimental studies (Ariely et al. 2009).
3These two conceptualizations of workersaltruism are the logical counterparts of warm glowand pure altruism,
the two motives that in economics have been associated with charitable giving and the private provision of public
goods, see Andreoni (1989, 1990).
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While these two approaches have proved to be useful in deriving theoretical insights as to
the implications of workerspro-social preferences, no attempt to quantify and discriminate the
importance of the two using non-experimental data has been made, in part because appropriate
eld data that would allow for sound econometric analysis are di¢ cult to come by. In this paper
we report ndings from a controlled experiment which is a rst, to our knowledge, attempt to
disentangle and quantify the two sources of intrinsic motivation. An important aspect of our
design is that we observe subjects provide real e¤ort in a natural work environment, thus heeding
Levitt and List (2007) who argue that pro-social behavior observed in the lab may not translate
into behavior in the eld. Similar type of labor market eld experiments using student workers have
been recently used to evaluate how various behavioral considerations, such as, reciprocity and peer
e¤ects operate in labor markets (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Gneezy and List, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt et
al., 2008).
We hired university students through email announcements to perform a short-term computer
data entry job on two separate occasions (one hour each). On the rst occasion we paid all students
£ 10 plus a performance bonus based on their performance. On the second occasion, we randomized
students into three di¤erent groups. For the rst group the second occasion was identical to the
rst one. This baseline condition acts as our control, as it accounts for any change in productivity
due to experience, learning and so on. For the two other groups, we implemented two treatments
aimed at eliciting, respectively, action-oriented e¤ort and e¤ort that is induced by both types of
altruistic preferences. More specically, in treatment A, we adapted the methodology developed
by Crumpler and Grossman (2008), which aimed at isolating and measuring warm-glow giving
in a laboratory setting, using a dictator game where the recipient was a charity. In that paper,
subjects were given a monetary endowment and were asked how much of that they would want
to allocate to a charity when the contribution of the subject crowded out the contribution of the
experimenter such that the charity always received a xed amount. They found that subjects
donated on average 20% of their endowment, which provides evidence of the strength of the warm
glow motivation for charitable giving. In our setting, we are interested in measuring the strength
of the action-oriented motivation for making labor donations, so in this treatment we told subjects
that besides their personal compensation, which remained the same as in the rst occasion, their
e¤ort could contribute to a charity of their choice, but their contribution would perfectly crowd out
our contribution so that the total amount the charity received was xed at £ 15. Given the nature of
the donation any additional e¤ort that the students might provide in this treatment, relative to the
baseline treatment, can be solely attributed to action-oriented intrinsic motivation. In treatment B,
we told subjects that besides their personal compensation, which remained the same as in the rst
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occasion, their e¤ort could contribute to a charity of their choice with no crowding out taking place,
so that the total donation that the charity received depended on their e¤ort. In this treatment,
both sources of pro-social behaviour are elicited. Therefore, any additional e¤ort that we observe
in this treatment relative to treatment A can be attributed solely to output-oriented altruism.
We found that e¤ort is positively a¤ected by an environment that induces action-oriented altru-
ism, while there is no additional impact due to output-oriented altruism. Interestingly, we found
signicant gender-related di¤erences in the treatment e¤ect. In particular, our results suggest that
women are very responsive to the treatment condition eliciting action-oriented altruism, increasing
their productivity between the two sessions by an additional 14% compared to women in the con-
trol group, while they do not display any additional increase in e¤ort due to concerns over output.
On the other hand, for men subjects, we nd no statistically signicant di¤erences in productivity
changes between the control and any of the treatment groups. This unresponsiveness suggests that
pro-social preferences are less salient for men than for female workers in our sample. Our results are
consistent with those obtained in studies that have examined experimentally di¤erences in social
preferences across gender.4
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the experimental design. Section
3 discusses the conceptual framework we use and derives the behavioral predictions. Section 4
presents the results of the study and section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Recruitment and Task
The experiment was conducted with undergraduate students recruited through email announce-
ments at the University of Southampton in the fall term of 2008. The job ad was asking for
students interested in assisting with data entry for a research project in economics. The announce-
ment stated that no prior experience was needed other than basic typing and some familiarity
with Microsoft Excel and that interested students should be able to work for a period of 2 hours
on two separate occasions over a four-week period. The email also indicated that compensation
would include a £ 10 xed-fee for each session plus a performance bonus. Interested students were
asked to respond indicating their availability, and selection among respondents was based on this
4See Camerer (2003) and Croson and Gneezy (2008) for an overview of the experimental evidence of gender
di¤erences in social preferences.
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information. In total we recruited 71 students of diverse academic backgrounds - Computer Science,
Biology, Social Sciences, Engineering - except Economics. It is worth noting that students were
unaware ex-ante that they were participating in an experiment.
The task consisted of typing data contained in input-output tables that the student received
in a booklet into an Excel Worksheet.5 Each table consisted of 48 randomly generated 3-digit
numbers (2 decimals) that always added up to 100. Each table in the booklet and the worksheet is
identied by a date (e.g. Jan 1953) and students had to enter each table frame in the corresponding
worksheet. For each table, students were told not to enter the last column and row, as these were
automatically calculated by Excel, but were asked to check that the numerical values calculated by
Excel for the last column and row corresponded to the ones on the booklet and that the value in the
bottom right cell equalled 100. The worksheet also contained a counter which tracked the number
of completed tables, the students compensation and the donation amount when applicable.6 This
particular data entry task was chosen such that performance is perfectly measurable (number of
table entries), and did not allow for cooperation or teamwork, as each participant worked separately.
The task was performed in a standard university o¢ ce on a desktop computer.
We employed 3 research assistants to give instructions and supervise student workers (each
student was supervised by the same assistant on both occasions). The research assistants after
greeting the student and introducing the task left the o¢ ce so that during working time the student
was not monitored. After one hour, the assistant came back and counted the number of entries.
At the end of the second occasion, payments were arranged and the student was asked to ll out
a short questionnaire. For each session, students received the pre-announced xed wage of £ 10,
plus a performance bonus of 10p per table entry. Their total compensation was on average £ 13 per
session.
2.2 Treatments
Each one of the treatments that were part of our design involved the students performing the task
in two separate occasions, 60 minutes on each session. The two sessions were approximately 2
weeks apart. On the rst occasion, all students were paid on the basis described above, so that
compensation depended on the amount of work performed. There was no mention in the rst
occasion that a charitable donation might be introduced later. On the second occasion students
were randomized into three treatments. Some underwent the rst treatment, which we call the
5See the attached Instructions sheet given to subjects for a more detailed description of the task.
6A screen-shot of the worksheet used for data entry is included in the Appendix.
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Baseline treatment and serves as our control. In this condition students were paid on the exact
same basis as in the rst session. The di¤erence in output between sessions 1 and 2 produced by
those involved in this treatment is going to serve the benchmark against which we are going to
compare performance in the other treatments.
In Treatment A, students were o¤ered the same personal compensation as in the Baseline Treat-
ment. Moreover, students were told that due to the funding of the project, in addition to their
personal compensation we were going to make a lump-sum donation to a charity of the students
choice (£ 15).7 It was explained to them that part of the lump-sum donation will be made on their
behalf based on their performance the sum of the donation we make and the student makes add
up to £ 15. In particular, for each table the charity received 30p on their behalf, while the rest
would be supplemented by us so that the charity received a total of £ 15.
Finally, in Treatment B, students were o¤ered the same piece rate as in the Baseline Treatment
and, in addition, were told that a donation will be made to their preferred charity on their behalf
based on their performance: for each table they typed the charity would receive 30p on their
behalf. To ensure that each subject in Treatments A and B valued the cause to which the donation
is directed we allowed participants to choose the donation recipient not only among a list of charities
with diverse missions, but also by indicating an alternative charity.8
Comparison of e¤ort obtained across the three treatments allows us to assess the relative
strength of the two alternative sources of pro-social motivation in the workplace. In particular,
comparing the changes in e¤ort we observe in the two sessions between Treatment A and the Base-
line allows us to quantify e¤ort due to action-oriented altruism, while the changes in e¤ort we
observe in the two sessions between Treatment B and Treatment A allows us to quantify e¤ort due
to output-oriented altruism. In the following section we present a simple framework that makes
these predictions regarding workersbehavior in the three treatments more precise. Employing a
within-subject design allows us to control for individual di¤erences in typing ability that might be
present such that any detected e¤ects can be attributed to the treatment.
It is worth mentioning that an important aspect of our design is that it shuts down alternative
instrumental channels which might cause workers to act pro-socially in the workplace, such as the
expectation of future labor market rewards (career concerns). It is also important that the use of
7The list of charities used in the experiment is included in the Appendix.
8Four subjects indicated an unlisted charity of choice. The option of not making any contribution was also present,
but nobody exercised it.
To ensure the credibility of the donation, subjects were also asked to indicate whether they wanted to receive a
thank you email from the charity. Slightly more than half of the subjects opted to receive a note.
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piece rate compensation removes the possibility that workers use e¤ort as a way to reciprocate for
any incentives o¤ered by the employer, as any additional e¤ort is remunerated.9
2.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section we present a simple specication of a workers utility function and derive optimal
e¤ort in three working environments that correspond to the three treatments that are part of our
design. This framework helps us formulate the main behavioral predictions that we then evaluate
in our eld study and helps with the interpretation of the results.
Suppose that a workers preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
(1) U(y; e; g) = y   c (e) +  (e) +  (g)
where y is income, e is e¤ort supplied and g is a public good the worker cares about. The cost
of exerting e¤ort is captured by the convex cost function, c (). The utility function in (1) embeds
both a concern for material compensation as well as the two sources of pro-social motivation that
are of interest here. Action-oriented altruism is captured by the concave function,  () ; which
represents the enjoyment the worker receives when e¤ort contributes to the production of a good
or service she considers socially worthwhile. Output-oriented altruism is captured by the the last
term in the utility function, the concave function  (), which implies that the worker is concerned
about the total quantity of a public good, g, that is provided.10 Notice that the workers e¤ort may
directly contribute to the amount of public good, that is, g = g (e; "), where " represents a vector
of other inputs in the production of the public good.
Suppose that the workers income is y = k + ep; where p is a piece rate the worker receives for
each unit of output/e¤ort, and k represents income from other sources plus possibly a lump-sum
payment related to the job. We examine e¤ort provision in three di¤erent settings.
First, the baseline case, where the workers e¤ort is unrelated to the production of the public
9While participants were not explicitly informed as to what was the monetary value of their e¤ort to us, it is
unlikely that their compensation would be received as very generous, as on average these students were making the
standard undergraduate RA hourly wage. Moreover, because personal compensation is the same across control and
treatment groups what we measure when comparing productivity across them is e¤ort induced by either type of
altruism, over and above e¤ort induced by feelings of reciprocity toward the employer, if any.
10 In the interest of clarity we present here the separable case. However, what follows does not rely on the separability
of the two e¤ects. It holds under a more general specication where the two e¤ects are not additively separable
U(y; e; g) = y   c (e) + (e; g); where @
@e
> 0; @
@g
> 0 and d
2
de2
< 0:
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good so both sources of pro-social behavior are absent. Then equilibrium e¤ort is given by:
(2) e s:t: c0 (e) = p;
namely, where the marginal cost of e¤ort is equated to the marginal private return of e¤ort. This
case corresponds to the Baseline Treatment in our experimental design.
Second, the action-oriented case, where workers e¤ort takes place in an environment that is
associated with the production of the public good but where e¤ort does not directly a¤ect the
quantity of the public good. Then equilibrium e¤ort is given by:
(3) e^ s:t: c0 (e^) = p+ 0 (e^) ;
where the marginal return of e¤ort is increased by the fact that the worker enjoys the act of
contributing to the production of the public good. Note that the properties of c () and () imply
that e^  e. This case corresponds to Treatment A in our experimental design, as in that context
workerse¤ort contributes to a charitable cause but has no impact on the total amount that gets
transferred. We summarize the rst main behavioral prediction:
Prediction 1 Any di¤erence in the amount of e¤ort supplied in Treatment A relative to the Base-
line Treatment, e^  e, is due to the workers action-oriented altruism.
Third, the complete case, where workers e¤ort takes place in an environment that is associated
with the production of the public good and is directly linked to the amount of the public good
produced, so both kinds of pro-social motivations are potentially induced. Then equilibrium e¤ort
is given by:
(4) ~e s:t: c0 (~e) = p+ 0 (~e) + 0 [g (~e; ")]
@g (~e; ")
@e
where the marginal return of e¤ort is augmented by its impact on public good provision. Note that
0 ()  0 implies that ~e  e^: This case corresponds to Treatment B in our experimental design, as
in that context workerse¤ort contributes to a charitable cause and it does not lead to crowding
out of the experimenters contribution.
We can now state the second main behavioral prediction of this framework:
Prediction 2 Any di¤erence in the amount of e¤ort supplied in Treatment B relative to Treatment
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A, ~e  e^, is due to the workers output-oriented altruism.
This simple framework provides us with some predictions regarding how we should expect that
a worker will respond to each of these settings that involve a monetary compensation and induce
di¤erent combinations of altruistic motivations (action and output oriented). In the next section
we present the results of the study.
3 Results
We are going to evaluate both behavioral predictions by assessing the change in productivity be-
tween the two sessions across the di¤erent treatments. In particular, we look at the percentage
change in output measured by the total number of completed tables in each session. Descriptive
statistics are provided in Table 1. In all treatments, it appears that there is an increase in aver-
age productivity between the rst and the second sessions. Despite a relatively simple task, it is
likely that some learning is taking place: in the second session students are more familiar with the
environment and the requirements of the job. This underlines the importance of having a baseline
treatment to control for all factors a¤ecting productivity changes between the two sessions other
than compensation. The box-whiskers graphs (Figure 1) and the kernel density estimates (Figures
2, 3, 4) allow us to gauge the distribution of productivity changes across treatment. We present all
the results seperately for each gender as we nd that responsiveness to treatment di¤ers consider-
ably along this dimension.11 In both cases, it clearly appears that there are some outliers in the
distribution. In the case of women, it is also evident that the distributions of productivity changes
for treatment A and B are very similar and shifted to the right compared to the distribution in the
control group.
We formally assess whether the distributions signicantly di¤er using the Mann-Whitney test
(M-W) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S). For women, the di¤erence between control and
treatment A and the di¤erence between control and treatment B are signicant, while the di¤er-
ence between treatment A and B is insignicant (see Table 2). For men each comparison results in
insignicant di¤erences. Thus, the non parametric tests conrm that for women there is no di¤er-
ence between treatments, while there is a signicant di¤erence between treatments and control.12
11No di¤erences have emerged with regards to other dimensions for which there is enough variation in the data,
e.g. previous work experience, occupational expectations (for prot vs non-prot sector), course of study (natural
sciences and engineering vs social sciences and education), donation to charity in the last 12 months, volunteering
activity in the last 12 months.
12We also tested whether the distributions di¤er signicantly across gender. For the control this is not the case
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The shift in the distributions between the two treatments and the control group can be estimated
non-parametrically using the Hodges-Lehmann median di¤erence. For females, this equals 0.104,
implying a 10.4% additional increase in productivity compared to the control group, and is signi-
cant at the 5% level.
Table 2 - Statistical Test Results
All Men Women
Control vs Treatment A
Mann-Whitney test 0:066 0:379 0:028
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:044 0:349 0:030
Control vs Treatment B
Mann-Whitney test 0:084 0:418 0:041
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:115 0:679 0:040
Treatment A vs Treatment B
Mann-Whitney test 0:482 0:478 0:413
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:429 0:380 0:438
One-tailed p-values are reported.
The magnitude of this e¤ect is in line with the one obtained in a regression setting. Due to
the presence of several outliers, we use a quantile (median) regression approach. The following
equation is estimated
yi = 0 + 1DIi + 2DOi + ";
where yi is the percentage change in productivity between the rst and the second sessions for
subject i, DOi is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject is in treatment B, while DIi is a dummy
equal to 1 if the subject has been treated. Thus, 2 measures the increase in productivity due
to output oriented altruism, while 1 measures the increase in productivity due to action-oriented
altruism. Consistently with the non-parametric tests, the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables
are not signicant for men, while for women the coe¢ cient related to action-oriented altruism is
signicant, indicating a 14% additional increase in productivity compared to the control group,
while the coe¢ cient related to output-related altruism is not signicant. Very similar results (not
reported) are obtained when using M estimation (iteratively reweighted least squares13).
(M-W two-tailed p-value = 0.967, K-S two-tailed p-value = 1.000). When pooling observations in treatments A and
B we nd that they are signicantly di¤erent across gender (M-W two-tailed p-value = 0.012, K-S two-tailed p-value
= 0.085). In light of the previous result that the two treatments are not signicantly di¤erent we pooled treatments
to improve the power of the test.
13 In particular, we use the STATA implementation, rreg, which uses Huber weights at the beginning of the com-
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Table 3 - Median Regression
All Men Women
DI .078** .027 .139**
(.039) (.092) (.060)
DO -.007 -.061 -.034
(.035) (.085) (.056)
Constant .088*** .111 .088**
(.029) (.073) (.043)
N: 71 33 38
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** [**] (*) denote signicance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
4 Concluding Remarks
Experimental methods have enhanced our understanding of how various behavioral notions, such
as fairness, trust, reciprocity, loss-aversion and peer e¤ects operate in labor markets (Falk and
Gaechter, 2008). Recently there has been an increased interest in understanding the motivating
factors behind workerspro-social behaviour in workplace settings. This paper contributes to this
literature by performing a rst, to our knowledge, eld experiment which attempts to disentangle
and measure the two alternative sources of workerspro-social motivation. Our results underline the
importance of action-oriented intrinsic motivation in the workplace, as it accounts for an increase
in e¤ort provision that is both statistically and economically signicant. On the other hand, we do
not nd any evidence of output-oriented motivation.
Another important nding of this paper is that there are considerable gender di¤erences in
pro-social motivation. In particular, in our sample, pro-social behavior is displayed by women, but
not by men. This nding is consistent with the literature on gender di¤erences in social preferences.
In particular, Eckel and Grossman (1998) report results from dictator experiments in conditions of
anonymity that indicate that women are more generous than men: women donate on average about
twice what men donate. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) also study gender di¤erences in a dictator
game where the price of giving varies and nd more nuanced results: women are more generous
when giving is expensive, and as giving becomes cheaper men are more altruistic. Mellström
and Johannesson (2008) carry out a eld experiment to examine whether o¤ering blood donors a
putation and biweights successively.
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monetary compensation might crowd out their intrinsic motivation for giving and nd this to be
the case for women but not for men.
The nding of a gender di¤erence in pro-social behavior in a workplace setting may have impor-
tant implications for womens economic outcomes, as if women are more likely to enter occupations
and sectors with characteristics that engender pro-social behavior, e.g. health, education and so-
cial care, and require less monetary compensation then gender di¤erences in pro-social motivation
would help explain the observed occupational segregation by gender, that accounts for a substantial
portion of the overall gender earnings gap (Gunderson, 1989).
An important related issue is that of accounting for the sorting of workers that takes place in real
labor market settings. The importance of sorting when measuring social preferences experimentally
has been demonstrated by Lazear et al. (2006). Accounting for self-selection will not only lead to
the detection of the treatment e¤ect for those workers who choose to sort into care-related jobs,
but also the identication of the characteristics that determine selection into sectors that engender
pro-social behavior. These issues are the subject of ongoing research.
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Instructions First Round 
 
 
Please read carefully the following instructions, detailing how the job should be 
performed and the structure of your compensation. If after reading the instructions 
you have any questions, please ask the Assistant.  
 
1. Job description 
 
The task consists of entering the numerical tables contained in the booklet that you 
were given into the Excel file that is currently open on the screen in front of you. 
 
Each table in the booklet is identified by a date (e.g. Jan 1953) and the data should be 
entered in the table frame in the Excel worksheet with the same date. After you enter 
all the numerical values for the table on one page, move to the next page and to the 
next Excel Worksheet. To make identifying activated Worksheets easier, once you 
start entering numbers in a table the corresponding Worksheet Tab will turn red. 
  
For each table, you should NOT enter the last column and row, as these are 
automatically calculated by Excel. Once you finish entering the data for a given table, 
you should check that the numerical values calculated by Excel for the last column 
and row correspond to the ones on the booklet. If that is not the case, it means that 
you made a mistake in entering the data and you should recheck the table and correct 
the mistakes. Also notice that the value in the cell on the crossing between the last 
column and row should always equal “100”.  
 
Your work will last for 60 minutes. After that time, the Assistant will come back and 
check your work.  
 
If you would like to stop at anytime before the end of the work period or you need to 
contact the Assistant, please dial the indicated contact number. 
 
2. Compensation 
 
For this session you will be paid £10, plus 10p for each table you enter. For example, 
if in the following 60 minutes you enter 10 tables, you will earn £11 (£10+10*10p), if 
you enter 20 tables you will earn £12 (£10+20*10p) and so on.  
 
Your compensation will be calculated at the end of the second session, at which time 
a transfer to your bank account will be arranged.  
 
 
 
Instructions Second Round, Second Treatment 
 
Job description 
 
The task is the same as in the previous session.  
 
Your work will last for 60 minutes. After that time, the Assistant will come back, 
check your work and arrange your compensation.  
 
If you would like to stop at anytime before the end of the work period or you need to 
contact the Assistant, please dial the indicated contact number. 
 
Compensation  
 
For this session you will be paid £10, plus 10p for each table you enter. For example, 
if in the following 60 minutes you enter 10 tables, you will earn £11 (£10+10*10p), if 
you enter 20 tables you will earn £12 (£10+20*10p) and so on.  
 
Your compensation will be calculated at the end of the session, added to what you 
earned in the first session and a transfer to your bank account will be arranged.  
 
Due to the funding of the project, in addition to your personal compensation, by 
filling out the attached donation form, you can designate a charity of your choice that 
will receive a donation of £15. Of this £15, for each table you complete 30p will be 
donated on your behalf, while the rest will be supplemented by us, so that the charity 
receives £15 regardless. For instance, if you enter 10 tables then 10*30p=£3 will be 
donated on your behalf and we will contribute £15-£3=£12, so that the charity 
receives a total of £15. Notice that your personal compensation is completely 
unaffected by the donation and that the charity will receive neither more nor less than 
£15. 
 
 
 
 
Instructions Second Round, Third Treatment 
 
Job description 
 
The task is the same as in the previous session.  
 
Your work will last for 60 minutes. After that time, the Assistant will come back, 
check your work and arrange your compensation.  
 
If you would like to stop at anytime before the end of the work period or you need to 
contact the Assistant, please dial the indicated contact number. 
 
Compensation  
 
For this session you will be paid £10, plus 10p for each table you enter. For example, 
if in the following 60 minutes you enter 10 tables, you will earn £11 (£10+10*10p), if 
you enter 20 tables you will earn £12 (£10+20*10p) and so on.  
 
Your compensation will be calculated at the end of the session, added to what you 
earned in the first session and a transfer to your bank account will be arranged.  
  
Due to the funding of the project, in addition to your personal compensation, by 
filling out the attached donation form, you can designate a charity of your choice that 
will receive on your behalf a donation of 30p for each table you complete. For 
instance, if you complete 10 tables, the charity you chose will receive 10*30p=£3. 
Notice that your personal compensation is completely unaffected by the donation. 
 
 
 
DONATION FORM 
 
Please choose the charity you wish to contribute by putting an X to the box next to 
your choice.  
 
NAME  DESCRIPTION  
Amnesty International Campaigns to uphold human rights across the world. 
 
British Red Cross Offers emergency response, health and social care, first aid and refugee services. 
 
Cancer Research UK 
Works toward improving our understanding of 
cancer and develop better ways to prevent, 
diagnose and treat the disease. 
 
Greenpeace UK 
Defends the natural world and promotes peace 
by investigating, exposing and confronting 
environmental abuse, and championing 
environmentally responsible solutions. 
 
Help the Aged 
Committed to addressing the issues that matter 
to older people; Provides healthcare, gives 
older people a voice and responds to 
emergencies in the developing world. 
 
MSF 
(Medecins Sans 
Frontiers\Doctors Without 
Borders) 
Committed to providing medical aid wherever 
it is needed, regardless of race, religion, 
politics or gender  
 
NSPCC 
(National Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children) 
Specialises in child protection and the 
prevention of cruelty to children 
 
Oxfam GB 
A development, relief, and campaigning 
organisation that works with others to find 
lasting solutions to poverty and suffering 
around the world 
 
RSPCA 
(Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals) 
 
Works to reduce the harmful impact of human 
activities on animals through education, 
campaigning and the application of ethics, 
science and law 
 
Other (Please specify) 
 
  
I do not wish to contribute 
  
Do you want to receive a thank you email from the charity?          yes [ ]   no [ ] 
 
 
Name:        
 
 
Signature:  
 
